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CHAPTER 3 
Heterodox Economics, the Fragmentation of the 
Mainstream, and Embedded Individual Analysis 
John B. Davis 
The original International Confederation of Associations for Pluralism in Eco-
nomics (ICAPE) statement of purpose began as follows: 
There presently exists a number of societies and associations of economists and 
other social scientists, all of which are united by their concern about the theo-
retical and practical limitations of neoclassical economics. In addition, they share 
the conviction that the current dominance of the subject by mainstream eco-
nomics threatens academic freedom and is contrary to the norm of method-
ological pluralism. (ICAPE 2003)1 
This statement rests on two assumptions that have recently come under increas-
ing scrutiny: first, neoclassical economics and mainstream economics are iden-
tical; second, mainstream economics (however understood) is monolithic and 
unified. The opposing view is that mainstream economics is increasingly made 
up of a collection of disparate research strategies that bear limited resemblance 
to one another and also to neoclassical economics as it is widely understood (Sent 
2006). I focus on the latter claim later in this essay, but first I want to emphasize 
the potential importance of this issue for ICAPE and heterodox economics. 
As its name indicates, ICAPE is defined as a pluralistic organization. More-
over, the evolution of ICAPE from ICARE (International Confederation of As-
sociations for the Reform of Economics) was predicated on the assumption that 
the mainstream is monolithic, exclusionary, and the very antithesis of a plural-
istic profession. Suppose, however, that the mainstream has now become more 
pluralistic or at least more divided internally in terms of content, if not in terms 
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of its professional organization. That is, suppose there are now multiple, rela-
tively independent mainstream research strategies, though the field continues to 
be dominated and controlled by a small set of mainstream PhD programs, jour-
nals, funding sources, acceptable methods, and individuals. I think all heterodox 
economists can see what the implications of this might be. Under such circum-
stances, mainstream exclusion of heterodox economics could be further pro-
moted under the protection of a newly proclaimed openness! 
I'm afraid I have little confidence in mainstream economics developing in 
such a way that heterodox approaches in economics will be welcomed into tra-
ditional economics PhD programs and other mainstream venues in any foresee-
able future. Thus a critical issue for ICAPE and heterodox economics, I believe, 
is how to address the emergence of pluralism within the mainstream. In this 
essay I offer one perspective on how this ought to be done, based on the premise 
that the mainstream is no longer neoclassical in one absolutely key respect. 
The first section examines the question of whether mainstream economics 
is becoming pluralistic. Here I introduce a particular view of what distinguishes 
mainstream economics from heterodox economics in terms of their differing 
core ideas. The second section considers the risks faced by heterodox economists 
if the mainstream is indeed becoming more pluralist. The argument distin-
guishes mainstream and heterodox economics in ontological terms and com-
pares this to the open- and closed-systems way of distinguishing them. The third 
section addresses opportunities for heterodox economics vis-a-vis mainstream 
economics when ontological issues are taken as paramount. Here it is argued 
that current mainstream economics suffers an important weakness that could 
constitute an opportunity for heterodox economics. The fourth section turns 
to the heterodox conception of the socially embedded individual, that is, the 
threefold notion that individuals are reflexive beings, that their interaction can 
be constructively understood in collective intentionality terms, and that their 
identity through change can be understood in terms of their possessing a capa-
bility for negotiating changing social associations. The final section returns to 
the issue of pluralism and its role in defining the identity and strategy of hetero-
dox economics. 
The Current Character of Mainstream Economics 
There is a spectrum of possible interpretations regarding the nature and direc-
tion of development of current mainstream economics. At one end of the spec-
trum is the view that, while there are admittedly new ideas and approaches in 
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mainstream economics, (1) it is still at bottom or in essence identical with neo-
classical economics. A related but slightly different view is that (2) neoclassical 
economics plays a dominant role in mainstream economics but that mainstream 
economics also includes other weU-established approaches that are nonneoclas-
sical in nature. Moving toward the other end of the spectrum, it might be argued 
that (3) neoclassical economics plays a stable but minority role in mainstream 
economics and that no nonneoclassical approach or approaches are (yet) dom-
inant-a pluralistic environment. Finally, at the other end of the spectrum it 
could be argued that (4) a non neoclassical approach or approaches dominate 
mainstream economics and that neoclassical economics occupies at best a de-
clining role. We can begin to determine where on this spectrum we believe main-
stream economics actually lies by looking at a recent exchange on the subject be-
tween James Peach and David Colander. 
On behalf of institutionalism, Peach (2003) has taken the first of these po-
sitions and argued that the core ideas of neoclassical (and classical) economics 
are at bottom the defining features of current mainstream economics. These 
core ideas are: 
(a) equilibrium method in the tradition of Newton 
(b) constrained optimization 
(c) individualist methodology 
Peach allows there has been change in mainstream economics but regards it as 
evolutionary, not revolutionary. Thus while he believes mainstream economics 
is essentially neoclassical economics, his view of neoclassicism's core ideas could 
also be held by others who simply regard neoclassical economics as dominant 
within mainstream economics (view 2) on account of the continued importance 
of these core ideas amid the emergence of other nonneoclassical ones. 
Peach's paper immediately followed one by Colander (2003) that lies some-
where toward the other end of the spectrum. Colander argues that neoclassical 
economics is dead and that the label does not describe current mainstream eco-
nomics, whose chief attribute he believes to ·be a modeling approach. His orig-
inal argument (2000) was that there are six defining attributes of neoclassicism 
that do not apply to most of mainstream economics: 
(i) a focus on resource allocation at a given moment in time 
(ii) some variation on utilitarianism 
(iii) a focus on marginal tradeoffs 
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(iv) the assumption of far-sighted rationality 
(v) methodological individualism 
(vi) the method of general equilibrium 
Colander's position could be either that neoclassical economics plays a stable 
but minority role in mainstream economics and that no nonneoclassical ap-
proach or approaches are (yet) dominant-the pluralistic situation (view 3)-
or that a nonneoclassical approach or approaches dominate mainstream eco-
nomics and that neoclassical economics occupies at best a declining role (view 
4). His view that none of the six attributes apply any longer to mainstream eco-
nomics (neoclassicism is dead) and that mainstream economics' chief attribute 
is a modeling approach suggests the latter. 
With these two lists of neoclassical characteristics, then, let us begin with 
the first view and ask how far we can move in the direction of the last. Peach's 
strong position, I think, cannot be sustained on account of the importance of 
game theory as the main microeconomic method since the mid-198os. Game 
theory clearly does not employ a mechanical, Newtonian equilibrium concept 
(a), since the Nash equilibrium concept emphasizes strategic interaction. More-
over, refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept by John Harsanyi, Robert 
Aumann, and others trade heavily in theories about expectations and learning. 
Nor can game theory really be regarded as a form of constrained optimization 
analysis (b). In the latter, constraints are formulated in terms of prices and in-
comes given by an impersonal market. In the former, payoffs depend on who in 
particular one interacts with and what other players' payoff structures are com-
pared to one's own. Mainstream game theory, however, is individualist (c) in 
virtue of its reliance on Nash noncooperative games and general lack of interest 
in the alternative von Neumann cooperative games framework. Thus Peach's 
understanding of neoclassical economics seems at best to support view 2. Impor-
tant parts of mainstream economics are not at bottom neoclassical. 
How far, then, can we move in the direction of the fourth view based on 
Colander's characterization of neoclassical economics? Colander seems to be 
right about characteristics i, ii, and iii, if not only for the reasons he gives, but 
his case is less clear in connection with characteristics iv, v, and vi. 
He cites new growth theory to argue that resource allocation at a moment 
in time is no longer central to mainstream economics (i). But this point can also 
be made in other ways. While game theory, information economics, and more 
recent behavioral economics recognize Pareto efficiency as a benchmark, they 
are really more concerned to explain outcomes that are not efficient. Resource 
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allocation is central when one believes markets are competitive. But all three of 
these influential mainstream approaches relax or abandon the assumption that 
markets are competitive in order to explain a wider range of phenomena. 
Colander also believes few mainstream economists accept anything re-
sembling utilitarianism (ii). This seems true of even the most neoclassically ori-
ented economists who employ formal objective functions to model individuals. 
"Preferences" are still of course referred to, but they are more logical relations 
rather than psychological ones. There was an interest for a time in attempting 
to explain preferences in greater detail, but most of this research generated para-
doxes that dampened continuing interest. Further, game theory assigns individ-
uals payoff strategies that have little connection to utilitarianism, and behavioral 
economics rejects the idea that individual psychology can be explained in terms 
of the traditional utilitarian desire/preference framework. 
Colander argues that game theory has seriously curtailed mainstream econ-
omists' focus on marginal trade-offs (iii) . Marginal trade-offs clearly are still 
important in large parts of mainstream economics, but it cannot be overlooked 
that game theory, the primary mainstream microeconomic method, does not 
employ differential calculus and does not reason in terms of marginal trade-
offs. Behavioral economics seems to have at best an ambivalent attitude toward 
marginal trade-offs. 
However, Colander's case with respect to far-sighted rationality (iv), meth-
odological individualism (v), and general equilibrium (vi) is less dear. It seems 
hard to deny that mainstream economics is concerned with rationality in some 
form, predominantly individualist, and generally committed to some form of 
equilibrium method. Colander's arguments that these characteristics no longer 
hold in mainstream economics seem to place too heavy an emphasis on small 
constituencies of economists who have challenged them as opposed to the great 
majority of mainstream economists who still employ them. 
Where does this leave us? To say that neoclassical economics is dead seems 
too strong, particularly if far-sighted rationality is broadened to rationality and 
general equilibrium method is broadened to just equilibrium method. The sec-
ond and third views are distinguished according to the balance between neo-
classical ideas and nonneoclassical ideas. But I suspect heterodox economists 
will find this useless hairsplitting and say that, whatever you call it, the ratio-
nality-individualism-equilibrium nexus cannot explain heterodox concerns with 
institutions, history, and social structure. 
My own view combines modified versions of Peach and Colander. I modify 
Peach by saying that the rationality-individualism-equilibrium nexus underlies 
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neoclassicism rather than th.at all at bottom is neoclassicism. In my view, neoclas-
sicism is one set of theories that employed these trans-theoretical categories. I 
also modify Colander by supposing that these categories persist in a mainstream 
economics that is no longer very neoclassical. Neoclassical economics may be 
dead, but the rationality-individualism-equilibriurn nexus remains alive and weU 
in mainstream economics. I use the word nexus to emphasize that it is the com-
bin.ation of these categories that is important. Heterodox economists may even 
draw piecemeal from these categories, but they introduce them into an alternative 
institutions-history-social structure nexus that transforms their meaning and 
significance. Thus what distinguishes mainstream economics and heterodox eco-
nomics in my view is not that the latter is defined in terms of a rejection of neo-
classicism but that it rejects the rationality-individualism-equilibrium nexus and 
is rather built upon the institutions-history-social structure nexus.2 
This still leaves the issue of pluralism or internal division in mainstream eco-
nomics. Whether neoclassicism plays a dominant role or a minority role in main-
stream economics, mainstream economics does appear to be more internaUy 
divided. Even if game theory, behavioral economics, experimental economics, 
new Keynesian economics, bounded rationality, new institutional economics, 
transactions cost economics, evolutionary economics, network theory, and so 
forth, still rely in important ways on the rationality-individualism-equilibrium 
nexus, they do so in a manner clearly different from the way that neoclassical 
economics does. But even more important, I think, is that many mainstream 
economists perceive the field to have changed. If one reads Nobel lectures over the 
last number of years, one does not find assertions about how new work extends 
old ideas so much as assertions about how new work departs from old ideas. 
Thus it seems that heterodox economists, who have made pluralism their cause, 
need to reconsider how they relate not only to a target that has changed its shape 
but also to one that is increasingly likely to claim it 'is free of the main fault het-
erodox economics attributes to it. 
Heterodox Economics vis-a-vis Mainstream Economics: Risks 
But perhaps the glass is half full rather than half empty. Does the emergence of 
debate and difference in the mainstream, given that pluralism is weU established 
in heterodoxy, suggest the future elimination of the division of economics be-
tween mainstream (or orthodox) and heterodox? One might particularly expect 
this to occur in a pluralistic environment if one thought that the practice ofbor-
rowing across the mainstream-heterodox divide was a possibly recurring one 
(e.g., Coats 2000). A more pluralistic environment across the whole of econom-
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ics would presumably enhance this borrowing, perhaps ultimately leading to 
general convergence between mainstream and heterodox approaches. We might 
frame this idea using Thomas Kuhn's distinction between normal and extraor-
dinary science. In a more pluralistic environment, extraordinary science essen-
tially becomes less extraordinary, while normal science atrophies, because plu-
ralism fosters a constant appropriation of ideas across paradigms. Indeed 
paradigms-if they could be said to exist at all-would be less stable and more 
transitory. Pluralism in the mainstream, on this scenario, would not bring new 
risks to heterodoxy but rather new opportunities. 
Like, I believe, most heterodox economists, I am skeptical of this convergence 
view. Any increased openness to cross-paradigm fertilization of ideas on the 
part of a more pluralistic mainstream seems unlikely to be extended to different 
heterodox paradigms. What seems may occur is a cross-paradigm fertilization 
of ideas within a more internally divided mainstream. Indeed, if one looks at 
the recent "revolutions" in the mainstream, they all seem to arise as internal 
developments. For example, game theory was ignored for forty years until it was 
seen as a way of revising Coumot and revitalizing imperfect competition theory; 
information economics derives directly from relaxing the neoclassical assump-
tion that markets are competitive and information perfect; and behavioral eco-
nomics only became a research stream in the mainstream via paradoxes in 
rational choice theory, though psychological theory has been around forever. 
My view is that arguments in the history of economics showing orthodox bor-
rowings from heterodox thinking are usually strained and depend heavily on 
claims about what was "in the air." In any case, mainstream economists today 
know almost nothing about heterodox economics, have virtually no interest in 
it, and are already consumed with trying to stay on top of the many develop-
ments in an increasingly more complicated mainstream. 
Why, then, does this divide seem so insurmountable? The conclusion of the 
previous section was that mainstream economics may be defined in terms of 
the rationality-individualism-equilibrium nexus, whereas heterodox economics 
may be defined in terms of an institutions-history-social structure nexus. Note 
that there is a different emphasis in distinguishing mainstream and heterodox 
economics in this way than is involved in distinguishing them as closed-system 
and open-system approaches respectively (Lawson 1997; Dow 2000). The latter 
has been pu t as follows: 
[A J closed-system approach presumes that all relevant variables and relation-
ships between variables are knowable, and thus amenable to representation by 
a single formal mathematical system. An open-system approach rather sees the 
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subject matter evolving such that not aU relevant variables and relationships are 
knowable. Knowledge is thus built up by means of partial systems using methods 
that are not commensurable enough for representation by means of a formal 
mathematical system. (Dow 2000. 158) 
While the difference between open and closed systems is ultimately ontological. 
I suggest that the point of entry and often the key focus for many proponents 
of the distinction is epistemological. That is. different assumptions about what 
one can know seem to determine what the subject matter of economics must be. 
Cons~quent upon these assumptions there are different strategies regarding eco-
nomic method or how one approaches the subject matter of economics. The 
closed-system approach. as the previous passage indicates. is committed to for-
mal mathematical modeling. Many have noted this and seen it as characteristic 
of the new mainstream economics. In contrast. the open-system approach 
adopts a collection of methods or forms of explanation-discursive. rhetorical. 
philosophical. mathematical, historical. logical. and so forth-that all emphasize 
different ways of knowing and explaining. 
What. alternatively, does the nexus distinction offer as a way of distinguish-
ing mainstream and heterodox economics? The nexus distinction is an explicitly 
ontological one and accordingly distinguishes the mainstream and heterodoxy 
with respect to rival views of reality and in regard to what exists. I cannot here 
make a full argument for this proposition but nonetheless believe it constitutes 
the fundamental difference between the two approaches. Thus the underlying 
defense of individualism in mainstream economics is that individuals alone exist 
and that society is a merely theoretical construct. But if only individuals exist. 
and if the world is not chaotic. then there must exist stable patterns of interac-
tion between them. Proofs of equilibrium are accordingly "existence" proofs. 
And. that these stable patterns of interaction exist in the world can then only be 
true because real individuals behave in a highly predictable way. that is. are in 
fact rational. In contrast. heterodox economists believe that institutions are real 
and social structures are real and not just epiphenomenal manifestations of 
individual behavior. They also believe that really existing cause-and-effect 
processes depend upon the arrow of time. 
How. then, does this different emphasis in distinguishing mainstream and 
heterodox economics help address the current relationship between them? I be-
lieve it assists us in two ways. one of which I address in this section and the other 
in the next. What J am concerned with here is the risks that heterodoxy faces in 
the form of increasing internal division characterized as pluralism in the main-
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stream. Against the convergence view of the future, I counterpose a future in 
which exclusionary practices are reinforced rather than moderated. The open-
and closed-systems manner of distinguishing mainstream and heterodox eco-
nomics, I suggest, seems more likely to predict convergence as opposed to exclu-
sion, because increasing internal division within the mainstream in principle 
creates the premise for an open-systems approach of many methods within the 
mainstream. That is, just as heterodox economists tend to an open-systems ori-
entation on account of pluralism within heterodoxy as a whole, so the emer-
gence of something like pluralism with the mainstream should bring about a 
comparable development. Then, open-systems thinking in both camps, it would 
seem to follow, would create conditions for convergence between mainstream 
and heterodox economics. 
What bothers me about this scenario is that I cannot imagine the main-
stream abandoning its exclusionary practices toward heterodoxy. In fact I can 
imagine an increasing tolerance for new approaches within the mainstream, 
combined with a continuing, shared intolerance toward heterodox economics. 
At this point in time, the means by which that intolerance would likely be 
expressed seems clear. Formal mathematical modeling is the current means of 
exclusion, and there seems to be no reason to think this will disappear with 
greater mainstream pluralism. But what is the basis for intolerance toward het-
erodox economics if the mainstream is in the process of creating the pluralist 
premise for an open-systems orientation? My answer is that the basis for that 
intolerance is the ineradicable difference between mainstream and heterodox 
economics regarding their underlying and, I believe, incommensurable onto-
logical commitments. That is, though the existence of competing research strate-
gies within the mainstream could make an open-systems view possible on an 
epistemological level, this could still be compatible with an absence of funda-
mental differences among mainstream economists on the ontological level and 
thus a monolithic posture toward heterodox economics. 
The risk I think this poses to heterodox economists is as follows. Should the 
heterodox critique of the mainstream be advanced on an open- and closed-
system basis, epistemological considerations become the criterion for pluralism. 
This could act to suppress attention to differences between mainstream and het-
erodox economics that are ontological in nature. This in turn allows the main-
stream means of critique of heterodoxy-the absence of a commitment to for-
mal mathematical modeling-to appear disinterested and scientific, since the 
mainstream can claim to be pluralist in virtue of its internal tolerance. As a re-
sult, the effect of the critique is to conceal an ontological disagreement in the 
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trappings of professional practices. Heterodox economics, it would be said, is 
substandard economics because it is insufficiently rigorous, professional, up-
to-date, and so forth .3 When it comes to battles for resources across PhD pro-
grams, journals, and funding sources, this is usually a completely successful 
strategy for eliminating one's opponents. Thus, heterodox economists, in my 
view, need to rethink how they intend to approach the mainstream. 
Heterodox Economics vis-a-vis Mainstream Economics: Opportunities 
Distinguishing mainstream economics as a rationality-individualism-equi-
librium nexus from heterodox economics as an institutions-hIstory-social struc-
ture nexus is valuable in a second way in that it can be argued to create specific 
opportunities for heterodox economics vis-a-vis the mainstream. The opportu-
nities I refer to are those that can be explained in terms of competition between 
these two broad approaches in terms of efforts to make one or the other appear 
more persuasive. Essentially this competition is ongoing at all times, but from 
time to time one or the other gains in persuasiveness. Of course, in our contem-
porary neoliberal world, the mainstream economics nexus is widely seen as 
more persuasive. But competition over the wider social visions in which each of 
these economics approaches continues, and thus both approaches are continu-
ally in a process of development that can temporarily strengthen or weaken their 
relative appeals.4 To further characterize this competition, I assume that each 
nexus needs to develop largely as a whole to continue to offer an integrated vi-
sion of the world but that the different components of each (whether three or 
more) tend to develop unevenly as research concentrates more on one or the 
other. This suggests that the relative appeal of either nexus becomes an issue 
when one of the components seems to be poorly theorized relative to the ad-
vance in theorization of the other components. I illustrate this first with respect 
to heterodox economics. 
There are many domains in heterodox economics that one might turn to in 
order to characterize development within each of the three components I have 
placed in the heterodox nexus. Dow (2000,166-67) emphasizes that it is one of 
the positive features of contemporary heterodox economics that work on differ-
ent approaches now involves a larger number of new researchers, so that hetero-
dox economists can increasingly engage in normal science to build theories in-
ternally rather than expend all their energies on ext~aordinary science meant to 
challenge and defend boundaries against the mainstream. In my view there has 
been considerable work done developing two of the components of the heterodox 
p:z 
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nexus. Much has been done to explain history and the irreversibility of time. 
Much has also been done to explain the operation of economic institutions. Less, 
I will argue, has been done to develop the theory of social structure, where this 
specifically involves an account of how individuals operate in social structures. 
In regard to history, Paul Davidson's insistence that economic processes are 
nonergodic provides a major criticism of mainstream macroeconomics and the 
foundation for much of post-Keynesian economics. Cambridge school thinking 
originally derived from Joan Robinson's critiques of equilibrium analysis has 
become central to much of current heterodox economics in connection with 
hysteresis and path dependency. Geoff Hodgson has emphasized and developed 
an evolutionary approach in the tradition of Thorstein Veblen that addresses 
the transformation of institutions and individuals. In regard to institutions, 
feminists have analyzed and detailed the long-ignored patriarchal character of 
social-economic institutions. Papers appearing in the Journal of Economic Issues 
in recent years increasingly involve applied institutional research, including such 
topics as (from a selection of recent titles) living wage ordinances, digital tech-
nology, small business policy, minimum wages, child labor law, agricultural 
decollectivization, casinos, sports, container shipping, consumer credit, and 
trade regimes. 
But heterodox economists have done less in regard to the theory of individ-
uals and social structure. Hodgson has repeatedly argued this in connection with 
his analysis of the complementary logics of upward and downward causation. 
His specific complaint is that institutionalists (and others) have failed to explain 
upward causation or how "individuals create and change institutions, just as in-
stitutions mold and constrain individuals" (Hodgson 2000, 326). Veblen and 
John Commons, he argues, did understand institutions as the outcome of indi-
vidual behavior and habituation, but contemporary institutionalism has not ad-
vanced significantly beyond their original insights. The problem in his view is 
not that current "top down" thinking is determinist but that little has been done 
to explain such mechanisms as learning that would account for the complemen-
tary reverse causation. Tony Lawson makes much the same argument from a 
critical realist perspective in connection with agency-structure models of society 
(Lawson 1997, 166ff.). Mainstream views are usually reductionist on the indi-
viduals/agency side of the model, and heterodox views often tend perilously 
close to being reductionist on the structure side. An adequate account of society, 
however, would explain the continual reproduction and transformation of both 
individuals/agency and structure due to their mutual dependence in time. Law-
son does not expect mainstream economics to contribute to this project. Thus 
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he agrees with Hodgson that it falls to heterodox economists to further theorize 
the relationships that mutually determine individuals and agency. 
What can we say of development in the mainstream nexus? In regard to 
rationality, there seems to have been considerable activity over the last two 
decades. Game theory recharacterizes rational thinking as interactive or strategic 
thinking. Bounded rationality and asymmetric information economics intro-
duce greater complexity into the characterization of individuals as cognitive 
agents. More recent behavioral and experimental economics exhibit the effects 
of psychology imperialism on mainstream choice analysis. Similarly, in regard 
to equilibrium methods, new approaches now exist side by side old ones. The 
Nash equilibrium concept represents a departure from the traditional neoclas-
sical, equation-counting thinking ofWalras.5 Computational methods consti-
tute an alternative algorithmic procedure to equilibrium reasoning (Mirowski 
2002). Endogenous growth theory introduces path dependency into long-run 
time paths. Altogether, then, considerable development has occurred on these 
fundamental mainstream themes. 
However, quite a different state of affairs obtains with respect to what is 
arguably the lynchpin of mainstream economics, namely, the theory of the in-
dividual. It has long been widely accepted among mainstream economists that 
there is little consensus regarding what makes multi person agents such as firms 
single individuals. But with neoclassical and mainstream economics being first 
and foremost about individuals, few believe the theory of the single individual 
is itself problematic. Indeed, mainstream economics is so confident on this score 
that it almost universally regards itself as methodologically individualist, mean-
ing that the atomistic individual conception can be treated as foundational for 
all approaches within the mainstream. I have argued (Davis 2002, 2003) , how-
ever, that mainstream economics suffers from an "emperor's clothes" problem, 
in that its conception of the individual as atomistic does not bear up under rea-
sonable scrutiny. Basically my argument is that the neoclassical tradition un-
derstood individuality in terms of individuals having their own subjective states 
of mind but that the progressive elimination of this conception of the individual 
from cardinalism to ordinalism to revealed preference to the current abstract 
formal treatment of the individual has eliminated for current mainstream eco-
nomics the specific "individuating" basis on which individuals were originally 
distinguished from one another. In effect, the development of a more pluralistic 
mainstream economics out of an earlier more monolithic neoclassical econom-
ics has eliminated the systematic basis on which individuals were theorized as 
individuals in the mainstream. 
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What, then, are the implications of these two paths of development in main-
stream and heterodox economics? Recall that the aim of this section is to identify 
opportunities for heterodox economics vis-a-vis a more pluralistic mainstream 
economics. I previously labeled the mainstream abandonment of the neoclas-
sical individual as an "emperor's clothes" problem, because it has gone over-
looked by most mainstream economists. But it also deserves this label, because 
of the central importance of the theory of the individual in social science and 
social philosophy-and the consequent vulnerability of the mainstream 
nexus-absent any redevelopment of this key component. Thus what I recom-
mend is that heterodox economists take seriously the diagnosis of Hodgson and 
Lawson that the individuals/agency thinking be further developed to provide a 
more adequate account of social structure for heterodox economists. Doing so 
would not only address that part of heterodox economics that lags in develop-
ment, but introducing a conception rival to the traditional atomistic one might 
also bring wider attention to the failure of mainstream economics to any longer 
offer a coherent alternative. In fact, there already exists a framework for the het-
erodox theory of the individual derived from, among others, Karl Polanyi (1968) . 
I term this the socially embedded individual conception and turn to it in the fol-
lowing section. 
The Socially Embedded Individual 
In this section I outline what I have previously argued (Davis 2003) are the main 
elements of the heterodox socially embedded individual conception. They are as 
follows: 
(1) Socially embedded individuals are reflexive beings. 
(2) Their interaction can be understood in collective intentionality terms. 
(3) They possess a capability for negotiating changing social associations. 
Combined, these elements explain how socially embedded individuals are dis-
tinct from one another and yet retain a dis·tinctness through change-two dif-
ferent but equally important requirements of any conception of the individual. 
Together they are meant to provide a coherent, systematic alternative to the now 
arguably defunct mainstream atomistic individual conception. 
(1) The principal challenge confronting the socially embedded individual 
conception is to explain how individuals can be both determined and determin-
ing with respect to the social-institutional frameworks in which they are active. 
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The strong holist tradition in heterodox economics-what Hodgson explains in 
terms of downward causation-makes any explanation of how individuals can 
be agents difficult. For example, Marx generally treats individuals as bearers of 
class identities such that they and their behavior are constituted for them by their 
membership in classes. Marx also says that individuals make their own history, 
if not under circumstances they have chosen, and his early alienation writings 
resist the idea that individuals can be reduced to their social characteristics. More 
recently, structure-agent models, such as Anthony Giddens's "structuration" the-
ory (Giddens 1984; cf. Archer 1995), have been developed across the social sciences 
that account for interdependence between individuals and social structures 
in terms of their mutual influence upon one another. However, these models 
seem to me incomplete in their characterization of individual agency, since they 
generally offer nothing more than the assertion that individuals are able to act as 
agents. What might provide the basis for a concept of individual agency is social 
psychology's treatment of the individual as a reflexive being that forms an indi-
vidual self-concept (e.g., Kaplan 1986), since implicit in the idea that individuals 
can reflexively appraise themselves is the idea that they see themselves as subjects 
rather than as objects. This offers a way of complementing the holist emphas.is on 
downward causation while yet retaining the idea that individuals are understood 
in large part in terms of their social characteristics. 
(2) Supposing individuals can act as agents, how might their social interac-
tion be understood? To be an agent, one must be able to form a purpose and act 
intentionally. Traditionally human intentionality has been understood in first-
person singular terms. More recent collective intentionality analysis, however, 
adds to this an individual's ability to form intentions in first-person plural terms, 
where this involves the use of "we" language (e.g. , Searle 1995; Tuomela 1995). 
This use of "we" language in an individual's collective intentions has the unique 
feature of embedding social influences within the individual. That is, for an 
individuaI to use "we" language successfulJy, it is generally necessary that that 
individual be confident that those to whom a usage of the term we applies would 
concur in the use of that "we" language. In effect, individuals are not auton-
omous with respect to their expression of collective intentions but embed them-
selves in networks of intentions. At the same time, even socially embedded 
individuals in this sense remain relatively distinct in that they must each (at least 
implicitly) ask themselves upon each usage of "we" language whether their own 
understanding of their sense of the scope of the term matches that of those to 
whom it applies.6 This check an individual implicitly performs constitutes a re-
flexive act as a form of self-assessment. A collective intentionality approach to 
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individual agency, then, can function within a heterodox structure-agent frame-
work that uses individual self-concepts as a basis for understanding how socially 
embedded individuals can still be relatively autonomous. 
(3) Supposing individuals can be distinguished from one another along the 
lines suggested previously, why should we suppose they retain the status of in-
dividuals over time? Though in principle we might believe that individuals have 
a capacity for self-assessment in interaction with others, many social scientists 
have argued that individuals lose (or never acquire) that capacity in that they ac-
commodate themselves to social pressures and engage in social identification 
rather than maintain individual identities. As Marc Granovetter put it, individ-
uals can become "oversocialized" in their many and continually changing asso-
ciations with others over time (1985). Thus we are in effect presented with a sort 
of identity test whereby we need to ask ourselves what it is that would enable so-
cially embedded individuals to retain a relative distinctness through change. 
The test that is relevant to a heterodox conception of the individual, it seems, 
is one concerning whether individuals retain a distinctness across their multiple 
social associations. As Nancy Folbre points out, individuals occupy "structures of 
constraint" in that they are "embedded in a complex structure of individual and 
collective identities and competing interpretations of these that sometimes they 
do not even know whose interests they are acting on" (1994, 16). Put in these terms, 
we can see how this test might be passed. Essentially individuals need to focus 
upon their capacity for self-assessment in terms of their relations to others and 
develop it into a capability to exercise and reexercise this capacity across any and 
all new social associations with others. Capability analysis, of course, has begun 
to attract interest since Amartya Sen's work on the subject. My suggestion is not 
only that heterodox economists ought to make capability analysis central to their 
understanding of individuals but that they ought to place special emphasis on 
that particular capability individuals can acquire of being able to appraise their 
own positions across their continually changing social relationships. Whether 
individuals were to develop such a capability could be one focus of a specifically 
heterodox social economic policy. 
These three elements, of course, constitute a philosophical framework that 
would need to be made far more concrete were it to function in any domain of 
heterodox economics in which analysis of individuals played an important role. 
Nonetheless, competition between mainstream and heterodox economics is 
very much in terms of broad, philosophical principles, and such principles often 
have quite immediate meaning for the respective proponents and opponents 
of these two approaches in economics. For example, most mainstream econo-
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mists and many others who share a neoliberal vision of society could generally 
give some basic characterization of methodological individualism as a founda-
tional doctrine for economics. At the same time, most heterodox economists 
and many others who share a more social vision of the world could equally ex-
plain why social relationships are central to individual life and why the atomistic 
view of individuals is inaccurate and misleading. The latter camp, however, in 
contrast to the former, seems to me to have an important opportunity at the 
current point in time. The anchor for the wider neoliberal social vision in main-
stream economics' conception of the atomistic individual seems to have been 
lost. Though the popular view of individuals as ultimately free of social ties will 
no doubt retain strong appeal in the future, the failure of mainstream econom-
ics to continue making a systematic, theoretical contribution to this wider vision 
may well have important effects in the long run. But whether wider doubts on 
this score come to be important is unlikely only because there exists a vacuum 
where the mainstream theory of the individual once existed. Doubts are only 
likely to become tangible if an alternative vision of individuality fills that empty 
space. Heterodox economists, I believe, are well placed to offer up the essentials 
of this alternative vision. 
Pluralism Redux 
I return to the issue of pluralism and heterodox economics' relation to it. My ar-
gument has been that internal division within mainstream economics at an epis-
temologicallevel conceals a monolithic practice at the ontological level and that 
it is the latter that is the basis for the mainstream's exclusionary posture toward 
heterodox economics. But if pluralism in heterodox economics is understood in 
open-systems terms and is also therefore pluralism at an epistemological level, 
might not that pluralism also conceal a monolithic practice at the ontological 
level, which would in turn function as the basis for a heterodox exclusionary 
posture toward mainstream economics? The open-systems approach is explicitly 
fallibilist (though not relativist) in allowing that "truths" are always subject to re-
vision .7 Such a position encourages tolerance toward approaches different from 
one's own, since it is never possible to demonstrate that anyone view is defini-
tively correct. In effect, one must always be prepared to assert that two conflict-
ing views might both be true. Previously, however, I argued that heterodox econ-
omists do not have this view with respect to neoclassical economics and in fact 
believe that neoclassical economics offers an incorrect representation of the 
world (Davis 1997) .8 1 still believe this to be the case and would be surprised to 
> 
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find anyone today willing to say they were a heterodox economist and also say 
that they thought neoclassical or mainstream economics might be correct. In-
deed, in my experience heterodox economists are quite intolerant toward neo-
classical and mainstream economics. 
This creates something of a dilemma for heterodox economics. It is one 
thing to be victimized by a mainstream that practices exclusion combined with 
contemptuous attitude toward the quality and professionalism of heterodox 
work. It is quite another to have one's own critique of the mainstream as intol-
erant be labeled a mask for a heterodox intolerance toward the mainstream. 
This is sometimes, in fact , the way that mainstream economists see heterodox 
economics (to the extent that they notice it at all). The fact that much of het-
erodox economics has been extraordinary rather than normal science, with the 
former not infrequently cast in political terms of revolution and overthrow of 
an old paradigm, is probably one source of this view. Should heterodox econ-
omists consequently reconsider their commitment to pluralism? Was the old 
ICARE designation (International Confederation of Associations for the Re-
form of Economics) a better reflection of heterodoxy? I close by rather recom-
mending that heterodox economists rethink the structure of pluralism, namely, 
where and how it applies, as well as how this assists us in defining heterodox 
economics. 
First, it does seem that heterodox economists on the whole are genuinely 
committed to an open-systems type of methodology when epistemology is being 
emphasized. Second, the ontological differences that heterodox economists rec-
ognize between themselves and mainstream economics do not indicate an open-
systems view. Heterodox economists, I believe--if I can reappropriate termi-
nology here-are committed to a closed-systems approach when it comes to 
their ontological commitments. There is simply a right or correct way generally 
to look at the world in terms of the centrality of institutions, history, and the im-
portance of social structure. Thus, heterodoxy is both an open- and c1osed-
systems approach and is thus truly pluralist only within itself (similarly to main-
stream economics). This suggests a way ofJinking two standard, opposed types 
of definitions of heterodox economics, namely, the pluralistic "horses for 
courses" approach (e.g., Hamouda and Harcourt 1988) and the single character-
istic, economics of dissent approach (Holt and Pressman 1998) . If discourses 
(heterodox and mainstream economics) can be distinguished from one another 
in terms of their main differences, those differences effectively create boundaries 
between those discourses that can be used to define them in a nonessentialist 
way, that is, without reference to their respective contents. Reference to contents 
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(postmodernists have argued) is problematic if these contents cannot be said to 
be shared. That is, there are particular problems that arise in connection with 
attempts to define things made up of diverse contents. I have accordingly treated 
the differentiating boundaries between discourses as identity conditions for those 
discourses (Davis 1999). Heterodoxy in this view is thus differentiated and also 
identified as a single discourse in terms of its (ontological) differences from main-
stream economics, while it yet remains pluralist with significant internal divisions 
across its different approaches. 
I close by suggesting that the ICAPE politics of pluralism may be a bit off tar-
get. The call for the mainstream to be more pluralistic is both beside the point-
because it is becoming more apparently pluralistic, at least on one level-and 
disingenuous-because at the ontological level heterodoxy cannot itself recip-
rocate. Of course, it is all fair and good for ICAPE to press on a nontheoretical, 
purely practical basis for openness, nondiscrimination, and a "free market" in 
ideas in a profession that has become increasingly oLigarchical, less concerned 
with the public interest, and more and more driven by a concern with status 
and personal wealth. These are ideals that ought to be defended across all of the 
humanities and sciences, and mainstream economics has been and can further 
be documented to be a relatively "closed" profession in this respect (cf. Hodgson 
and Rothman 1999). But this sort of program does not stem directly from the 
particular content of heterodox economics. It stems from a commitment to so-
cial values oflong standing that operate across the humanities and sciences and 
indeed in society generally. Only, it seems, were these ideals and values to become 
shared across heterodoxy and the mainstream would there then be hope for a 
wider pluralism in economics. 
NOTES 
1. Subsequent to the conference in Kansas City this statement was revised to be pro-
pluralist rather than antineoclassical. 
2. I see each nexus as including these three components, but others might see the par-
ticular components as well as their number somewhat differently. This does not seem to 
me to fundamentaUy affect the arguments discussed subsequently. 
3. For example, Paul Krugman asserts that critics of formalism in economics are not 
so much concerned with method as with the fact that formalistic methods "refute their 
pet doctrines" (1998, 1829), much as Robert Solow had previously claimed that "We 
[mainstream economistsi neglected radical economics because it was negligible" (Solow 
1971,63). 
4. The issue here is persuasiveness, not progress. 
5. Ironically, fixed-point existence proofs, though derived from von Neumann's early 
.... 
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work on games, were the basis for the Arrow-Debreu argument regarding market equi-
librium (see Giocoli 2003). 
6. Thus, contrary to ordinary intuition, the use of (solipsistic) "I" language does not 
reflexively individuate a person, since the contrast with others is missing. In institution-
alism, this idea dates back to Charles Cooley's "looking-glass" self-concept (1902). 
7. "All knowledge is fallible, partial, and likely transient. Indeed, if progress is to be 
achieved, continuous transformations in even our currently most explanatorily powerful 
accounts are to be encouraged" (Lawson 1999,5). 
8. It may also be argued that heterodoxy sometimes manifests a lack of internal epis-
temological tolerance, but I put this issue aside here as a less immediate concern. 
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